Syria: Humanitarian Aid Versus Sharks and Leeches

The real question is not about the nature of the aid or the name given to it, but rather about providing the answer to the How, i.e. what channels should be used for aid to reach the population without exacerbating and entrenching the conflict?

Russia and the Damascus regime are engaged in a powerful propaganda campaign aimed at making people believe that Western countries - through their policy of sanctions and their refusal to finance reconstruction - are responsible for the misfortunes of the Syrian people. Some EU countries are sensitive to this argument, and Europe - despite being the largest donor of humanitarian aid - finds itself on the defensive.

Unfortunately, all indications suggest that as the conflict continues, the population’s plight will continue to deteriorate. Given this reality, Europe needs to adopt a strategy that would allow it to better demonstrate that its posture is appropriate, in order to have more influence on the situation, and help the population beyond humanitarian assistance.

It can do this, firstly through a public diplomacy effort, by reformulating its message - "no reconstruction without a political transition" - into a positive one, without changing its actual stance on the issue. To counter Russian and Syrian disinformation, Europe could, for example, formulate and publicly present a plan for reconstruction aid, over a given period of time. It could further announce that it can - and will - provide this aid to the Syrians for the reconstruction of their country, and show willingness to release these funds, if a credible political transition is initiated. This is not in any way a call for shifting red lines or changing the political conditions linked to reconstruction - as defined by Brussels - but merely for reversing the discourse to show that the one hindering the delivery of assistance and depriving Syrians of it is Assad himself. The data clearly demonstrates this reality.

Announcing such a plan and specifying the conditions for its implementation would give more weight to Europe’s statements and would put it in a stronger position to play a political role. It would highlight its capacity and willingness to contribute financially, economically and technically to Syria’s recovery. Addressed to Russia in priority, this overture could be accompanied by an effort to revive multilateral consultations, in the form of some "contact group" involving all the countries concerned by the conflict.

More concretely, Europe could take better advantage of its preponderant role among the countries providing aid, by negotiating more immediate conditions with Russia (rather than with Assad, who sees nothing but danger and an obvious admission of weakness in any concession). It would be a matter of saying that Europe is ready to commit the funds that the Syrians actually need including a potential upgrade from humanitarian aid to preliminary development projects if only Europe could use other channels than those controlled by the regime in Damascus. The EU can instantly propose safe channels as it has worked in the past with a broad network of civil society groups on the ground that meet the criteria of impartiality and transparency.

Moreover European countries and the United States are gearing up for the next battle at the UN Security Council to secure the renewal of the resolution authorizing the delivery of aid to the four million Syrians across the Turkish border, but this matter does not concern the population under Assad’s control.

The message to Russia would be simple: Europe is willing to offer various forms of aid to Syrians on the condition that under no circumstances the money passes through Assad’s channels and his entourage. It is imperative to get out of the self-defeating dilemma Europe has locked itself in. 

Copyright: Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP