Three Franco-German Priorities for Europe’s China Policy: Economic Security, Proactive Innovation and Coordination on Asia-Pacific 

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is a pivotal moment which serves as a reminder that China is not the most direct geopolitical threat to Europe. But Beijing’s support for Russia, however muted it may currently be, and its anti-NATO stance remain a direct challenge to European security. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) openly shares with Putin’s Russia an aversion to democracy. The two countries have promised each other mutual support and no limits to cooperation. This article is the second part of a series published jointly by Institut Montaigne and MERICS, titled A Franco-German Approach to China. 

China’s alignment with Russia is just one reason why the separation between cooperation, economic competition, and systemic rivalry - put forward by the EU in March 2019 - cannot be maintained. Beijing’s blocking of European imports carrying Lithuanian components challenges the integrity of the European single market and the EU’s economic security. By keeping in place its escalatory countersanctions of March 2021 against the EU (including those against parliamentarians and research institutions), China continues to undermine the democratic foundations and free speech in Europe.

Nevertheless, China’s importance as a market, production and innovation hub will continue to attract Western companies. There remain issues where cooperation with China will be needed - although this does not mean it will be forthcoming. Europe and China are the world’s largest energy consumers, with a degree of dependence on external producers, and Europe’s climate targets can be shared by China, whose emissions threaten its own ecosystem. Although infrastructure investment and development aid in third countries are largely competitive, China is increasingly a creditor that needs reliable lending rules. In theory, Europe and China could also pursue shared interests in conflict prevention and mediation.

France and Germany: from convergent analyses to convergent policies regarding China

In assessing the very varied picture that China represents, France and Germany have never fundamentally differed in their appraisals - during China’s phases of reform and opening up as much as in the increasingly difficult times they are encountering now. But they have often responded with a different tempo, intensity, and emphasis. 

This is in part due to the asymmetry of their relationships with China. It is heavily dominated for Germany by a strong industrial and market presence in China, while France’s relationship is concentrated around several high-tech sectors, the luxury and cosmetics market and, more recently, agriculture. A permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and with a significant maritime presence in Asia-Pacific, France remains more prone to strategic and diplomatic initiatives, while Germany has long prioritized its commercial instincts.

But China’s development has recently canceled out many of these differences. The scale of its industry and high-tech sector now dwarfs Germany’s. Competition from China in third countries is growing rapidly. At the same time, market distortions, doubts about trustworthiness and security issues associated with China’s opaque party-state capitalism are producing growing spill-over effects across the EU. 

France and Germany have struggled to define a cooperative agenda with Beijing

China today is an actor very much "inside Europe". It affects political developments, public security and European unity in legitimate and also more clandestine ways, or with explicit divide and rule tactics. China’s reinterpretation of the global order and multilateral rules has narrowed the space for cooperation in international institutions. Diplomats in Paris and Berlin struggle to define a comprehensive cooperative agenda with Beijing.