Power and Progress

From the early 19th century novel Dr. Frankenstein to today's debates on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and ChatGPT, humanity has almost always had a tense relationship with technology, which is fueled by the belief that technological evolution cannot be interfered with, because technological development on its own leads first to productivity gains and then to progress. 
 
This approach did not even raise the possibility that the direction of technological development would in fact be determined by political preferences, power relations and the distribution of power in society. More importantly, it ignored the relationship between technology and general social welfare. The negative consequences of certain choices were not even open for discussion.
 
Daron Acemoğlu and Simon Johnson, professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), one of the world's leading universities, challenge this mechanistic approach to technological development in their co-authored book Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. They also caution the reader against a danger they call the "vision trap". According to them, "once a vision becomes dominant, its shackles are difficult to throw off because people tend to believe its teachings". This ever-existing danger today results in a failure to question the narrative of the technology giants and to consider alternative paths for technological development and its applications.  

These are the reasons why the authors argue that it is neither possible to understand "Progress", which includes technological development, nor the issue of distribution, without understanding this dimension of power. Their thesis, which they support with historical examples, is that the contribution of technology to general social welfare was only made possible because of social struggles. 

Acemoğlu and Johnson analyze some of today's important issues that gravitate around the issue of technology and its use. These include the future of globalization, income inequalities, the vast surveillance and controlling powers that AI provides to states, the ability of big tech companies to abuse the power they hold by collecting free data and enriching a limited number of individuals. This use of technology has the effect of weakening democracies, as income inequalities and employment opportunities shrink due to technological developments. 

Arguing against the adherents of the "productivity bandwagon" thinking that link technology automatically to productivity and to development, the authors present a comprehensive technological and economic history of the past 1000 years. For them the key issue is to understand whether technology contributes to general and shared social welfare. They conclude that great leaps in technology in any given period do not necessarily contribute to an increase in general welfare.

Although this dimension is underemphasized, the international conjuncture too plays a significant role in the increase in shared prosperity. The presence of the Soviet Union and the context of the Cold War were factors in the period of about 30 years after the Second World War, when the distribution of income was the most equitable in world history. 

Indeed, the period between 1945 and 1975, which the French refer to as "les Trente Glorieuses", had led to significant productivity gains, as well as an increase in employment opportunities. At the same time, the working class was able to increase its share up to 70 percent of the value produced. The existence of an alternative economic system and the balances established thanks to the organization of working people in developed countries have led to such a result in terms of distribution. According to the authors, two developments, the foundations of which were laid in the early 20th century, defined the post-war structure: the first was "a direction of travel for new technology, that generated not just cost savings through automation but also plenty of new tasks, products and opportunities; and second an institutional structure that bolstered countervailing powers from workers and government regulation." 

The paradigm of this period of "shared prosperity", lost its appeal in the 1970s after the quadrupling of oil prices due to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The alternative model was not favorable to the egalitarian distribution approach at all. 

By the late 1970s, the thesis that the sole responsibility of corporations was to maximize profits and protect shareholders' wealth became widely accepted. In this context, since maximizing profits required lowering labor costs, digital technologies evolved in a way that facilitated automation and the elimination of unskilled labor. The different development paths that had begun to germinate in the early 1970s by the original band of techno-hackers, were abandoned. For Acemoğlu and Johnson, it is not automation itself that should be considered problematic, but the technology portfolio that emphasizes automation and does not create new lines of work for workers. This choice combined with globalization and China’s ascent contributed to income inequality in the following years, as well as to social disintegration due to the flight of some industries abroad. 

The authors take a very negative view of what they describe as "the mother of all inconvenient technologies". Their criticism is harsh: "(AI) is a vision rooted in ideas but it receives a further boost because it enriches and empowers elites corralling technology toward automation and surveillance...". 

AI is not able to do this. However, the AI myth promotes the adoption of a rigid automation approach, disregarding or minimizing the flexibility and creativity that humans can exhibit, especially in service industries and even in industrial production lines. Alberto Romero, who has worked in this field for many years, is quoted in the book by the authors as saying: "The marketing power of AI is such that many companies use it without knowing why. Everyone wanted to get on the AI bandwagon".

In addition to a blind love of automation, AI also helps establish a regime of constant surveillance. This trend, which initially started in the field of production of blue-collar workers, is gradually spreading to white-collar workers. 

Arguing that this path was not pre-destined, the authors write that "The current approach that dominates the third wave of AI, based on massive data harvesting and ceaseless automation is a choice. It is in fact a costly choice, not just because it is following the bias of elites toward automation and surveillance and damaging the economic livelihood of workers. It is also diverting energy and research away from other, socially more beneficial directions for general-purpose digital technologies."

Thirdly, new technologies and the machines that use them can be designed to be more useful in making accurate information more accessible, to improve decision-making. Fourth, if new technologies can be used to facilitate the coming together of people with different skills and know-how, they will also increase economic dynamism. However, recognizing that companies do not want to spend money on such a change of course, the authors close on a pessimistic note: "human-complementary machines are not very attractive for organizations when they are intent on cost cutting". 

To date, the use of digital technologies and AI has generally driven out workers or pressured down wages in low-education, low-skill, blue-collar sectors. One important reason for the recent flurry about AI is the fear that white-collar jobs and industries for the highly educated will be next. This is the first time that the jobs of the educated - lawyers, journalists, teachers/academics and the like - who have so far benefited from the applications of digital technologies are under such a serious threat. Their greater ability to speak out, and their capacity to organize a social opposition, may prevent technology from moving in the direction of continued and greater automation.

One of the most pessimistic chapters of the book is titled "Democracy Breaks". After recalling that the internet and later social media were once the tools that strengthened democratic movements and facilitated societies' resistance to corrupt regimes, the authors summarize the current situation as follows: "[...] Once [digital]  tools started being used primarily for massive data collection and processing, they became potent tools in the hands of both governments and companies interested in surveillance and manipulation. As people became more disempowered, top-down control intensified in both autocratic and democratic countries, and new business models based on monetizing and maximizing user engagement and outrage flourished."
 

Digital technology is neither democratic nor anti-democratic. Decisions and choices about how to use this technology define its function. The direction in which tech companies have devoted all their power to the collection of personal data and the revenue they generate from it has fostered authoritarianism. "(E)arly hopes associated with digital democratization have been dashed because the tech world put its effort where the power and money lie - with government censorship."
 

After all this criticism, the authors conclude with some suggestions that they believe will slow or even reverse this trend in the coming period. Their optimism about the possibility of a new path and a new vision for AI technology is inspired by the valiant political struggles and successes of the early 20th Century Progressive movement when their efforts in a place like the United States were deemed almost delusional. The authors quote attorney (later Justice) Louis Brandeis approvingly at the beginning of their final chapter, Redirecting Technology: "Most of the things worth doing in the world had been declared impossible before they were done."

A democratic political environment and a space for debate that is not poisoned by self-serving high-tech giants and the social media under their control are the prerequisites for moving in such a direction. 

Copyright Image: WANG Zhao / AFP