French & American Defence: For Better or for Worse?

Paris is popular in Washington at the moment. There, France is indeed seen as a solid and trusted ally, able to intervene quickly, and as an often unavoidable partner on defence and security issues. In American military circles, the French are known for their excellence and their ability to access the highest political levels, which their European counterparts, German and British in particular, envy.

It is indeed an impressive turn of events given that only 15 years ago, France, which had criticized the American intervention in Iraq, was accused of cowardice, and thus sent back to the darkest moments of its history. Although the arrival in power of President Emmanuel Macron, whose centrism and pragmatism seduced both conservatives and liberals, did play a role, the French popularity rating had long since risen from the abyss of the 2003 crisis.

"The changeover really took place during François Hollande's presidency, with the French decision to go to the rescue of its Malian ally in early 2013, 10 years after Iraq"

The Bush and Chirac administrations, determined to turn the page after 2003, made an effort of rapprochement, which was later pursued by Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy. France's return to NATO's integrated command in 2009 swept away some of the United States' persistent suspicions regarding France's European defence ambitions, hitherto perceived as competing with the Atlantic Alliance. Masters in the art of administration, the French produced  a significant amount of non-papers, notes and proposals at NATO, which attracted the attention of their American interlocutors. In 2011, the joint intervention in Libya, led by France and the United Kingdom, and "monitored backstage" by the Americans, cemented a new Franco-Anglo-American intervention format.

However, the changeover really took place during François Hollande's presidency, with the French decision to go to the rescue of its Malian ally in early 2013, 10 years after Iraq. For Washington, Mali, and later the extension of the Sahel operation, showed France's determination to take in charge its own security and that of its allies, to share the burden of the fight against terrorism, which for too long the Americans had felt was weighing on their shoulders alone. Moreover, the French services effectively promoted the Sahelian intervention in Washington, thus giving it both visibility and a broad political support, including among members of Congress.

Over the following years, Franco-American military cooperation intensified. France joined the American coalition against ISIS in Iraq in 2014, and then in Syria in 2015. The defence relationship between the two countries progressively became more institutionalized. Following the 2015 attacks, military intelligence agencies in both countries were given special instructions to access operational intelligence on theaters of common engagement, and a "Lafayette Committee" was set up to monitor their fluidity. The "Five Eyes + France" format is now frequently used by Americans, when they wish to share intelligence on Daesh or North Korea with their new privileged allies.

Thus, in just a few years, military cooperation has increased in every field: counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, territorial issues in Europe, space, and, of course, Sahel. Years of cooperation on the field have favored the emergence of a strong operational trust between the two countries’ armed forces. Moreover, the French decision-making process, which is fast and very focused on the President, like the American system, is considered both reliable and efficient, as it was for example when it led punitive strikes against the Damascus regime, after the latter used chemical weapons.

"It is legitimate to question the sustainability of such a strategy: can the Franco-American relationship really remain impervious to the current transatlantic upheavals?"

All this has created a very "pro-French" atmosphere at the Pentagon, which has substantially contributed to France’s popularity among the Trump administration. Not only does President Trump like and appreciate the military - as evidenced by his willingness to surround himself with generals, e.g. his chief of staff, his Minister of Defence and his first two national security advisors - but he also makes no secret of his clear preference for allies who invest in defence over those who prioritize trade. This protects France from the type of attacks that the US repeatedly makes against Germany, for instance. The quality of the military cooperation in recent years explains why Macron, whose top priority is the security of the French, has relied on Trump, and vice versa.

However, it is legitimate to question the sustainability of such a strategy: can the Franco-American relationship really remain impervious to the current transatlantic upheavals? The Trumpian project to dismantle the Obama legacy opposes the two allies. So does the Iran issue, on which the French firmness and continuity had paid off, but on which Washington no longer cares about the opinion of its allies. While the Administration continues to undermine multilateralism, crisis management and collective security systems could be weakened, thus damaging both French and European interests (for example, regarding non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, etc). Concerning NATO, while the French share American concerns about the low defence spending of many allies, they have no interest in the Trump administration targeting Germany so aggressively, or in jointly tackling security and trade issues. Trouble at NATO could add further uncertainty in an already unstable transatlantic world, and push allies to distance themselves even further from the US. As the scope for political and economic confrontation between transatlantic allies expands, it will become increasingly tricky to isolate Franco-American military cooperation from these growing tensions.