Blacklisted by the US: Reassessing Diplomacy in the Western Balkans

Interview with James Ker-Linsday

Visiting Professor at LSEE-Research on South East Europe at the London School of Economic

The US has recently made a number of significant diplomatic moves in the Western Balkans. In May, Antony Blinken declared former Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha persona non grata, due to his involvement in corruption. This was then followed by an extension of the blacklist to a number of other figures from the Western Balkans, based on their role in the destabilization of the democratic process in the region. What does this say about the US strategy in the Balkans, and whom will it impact? James Ker-Linsday, Visiting Professor at LSEE-Research on South East Europe at the London School of Economics, answered a few of our questions.

What has been the history of the US diplomatic strategy in the Western Balkans?

The particular jumping off point for US involvement in the Balkans is the collapse of Yugoslavia at the start of the 1990s. Let’s keep in mind that during this time, there was a sense of Western invincibility and of an imminent New World Order, fueled by the end of the Cold War. This led to the 1995 Dayton agreement, which brought peace to Bosnia.

However, the region was weakened again four years later, when the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia began. The subsequent US decision to step in opened up a new direction in international intervention, which one can argue laid the ground for the Iraq War. As a result, the US disengaged from the Balkans under the Bush administration. This was reversed somewhat under Obama, when the US began to focus on the region again.

Surprisingly, the Trump administration also showed a great deal of interest in the Balkans. It also marked an ideological shift in the US’ diplomatic agenda vis à vis the region. While the Administration’s approach towards the diplomatic dynamics of the Serbia-Kosovo issue had a lot of long term watchers horrified, it did mark an important change. Traditionally, US policy had tended to be rather pro-Albanian. This has not always been helpful. When dealing with conflicts, taking a position between belligerents doesn’t necessarily help to resolve a situation. There needs to be a way to recognize the issues and perspectives of each side, even if you don’t agree with them. There were some signs of this under the Trump Administration. And had it been conducted more skilfully, the new approach could have been beneficial to the geopolitics of the region. But it wasn’t. There was no nuance or apparent strategy.

The Biden administration is clearly reassessing the US’s strategic agenda. At first glance, it appears that the US is much more willing to work with European partners in the Balkans. The problem is that the Europeans don’t seem to have a clear idea on how to approach the region.

With that background in mind, what can we make of Anthony Blinken’s recent public designation of Sali Berisha, former Prime Minister of Albania, and his blacklisting of a number of other Balkan figures? Where does this approach come from, and why now?

I think this needs to be understood in the context of wider US policy towards the region. In many ways, these measures seem in line with the previous US administrations, especially Democrat administrations, which have tended to be much more focused on regional stability. What characterized Trump’s style was a transactional approach in which the end justifies the means. We saw this in the negotiations Washington conducted between Serbia and Kosovo.

The Biden administration is clearly reassessing the US’s strategic agenda. At first glance, it appears that the US is much more willing to work with European partners in the Balkans.

The Washington Agreement in September 2020 was essentially less about the two countries and more about what the US wanted, such as limiting Russia and China’s role in both countries. The negotiations also secured Israel’s recognition of Kosovo in exchange of Serbia and Kosovo moving their embassies to Jerusalem. This wasn’t about helping either Kosovo or Serbia. It was a wish list for Trump to sell to the US electorate prior to the election. It gets more complicated with the Biden administration, however. New governments almost always tend to want to distance themselves from their predecessors’ policies.

But it needs to be done without disrupting the existing order. It does not look good for countries to admit that they made fundamental mistakes. Since Biden’s arrival in the Oval Office, a lot have wondered whether the new President will recant Trump’s stances regarding Asia, Arab countries or the Middle East; such as the decisions to open up greater diplomatic relations with Taiwan or the decision to recognize Morocco's sovereignty over the Western Sahara. The same can be asked about the Western Balkans and the Washington Agreement. In truth, I don’t expect that the Biden administration will formally abandon it. It will just let it drop and will want to show that it is more focused on values and long-term goals. A focus on tackling corruption, and linking this with wider regional stability, is a good way to start.

What does this mean for Europe?

The European Union has tried to promote the integration of the Western Balkans, but without much success. Its strategy, nonetheless, is to put the rule of law at the forefront of its reform efforts. To a certain extent, the US, by introducing measures aimed at tackling corruption, is following a similar path.

I understand those in Washington and Brussels that see this as a valuable approach. However, it does carry risks. It could push actors in the region to turn to partners that are less prone to imposing conditions on diplomatic relations, at least less openly. Russia or China are obvious examples. Whereas the US and the EU use the "carrot and stick" approach - the EU giving the perspective of membership if values are respected, and the US now imposing new sanctions if they aren’t - Moscow and Beijing present themselves as partners that respect the sovereignty of Balkans countries. In this sense, they propose a narrative that goes against the one of the West.

But while it may seem like China and Russia do not ask for anything in return, in reality they exchange help and vetoes in the UN Security Council against access to the countries’ markets. This happened in Serbia, where the price for the Russian support in the Security Council was Serbia handing over large parts of its energy complex to Russian control, through Gazprom. A similar example is found with the growing use of debt diplomacy, with China openly financing massive infrastructure projects in the region.

The European Union has tried to promote the integration of the Western Balkans, but without much success.

Here, if the country benefiting from the loan cannot repay it, it will have to make concessions and give access to the market to Chinese actors. In reality, Russian and Chinese cooperation don’t come without conditions. It is just a different type of conditionality and cost.

With this in mind, it appears that the EU and the US are doing what they are doing with the best motives, though the negative of this might be that it is opening the door for other actors, less straightforward about their involvement, but not less interested.

What does the situation look like from within the Western Balkans?

We cannot talk about regional developments without mentioning the impact of Covid-19. As everywhere else, it has had a profound impact. Perhaps the stand out development is that it has strengthened Serbia’s position. Belgrade was very clever with its handling of vaccinations, buying from Europe, Russia and China and then distributing these to neighbours. With one of the highest vaccination rates in the world, it showed a degree of organization that left many observers surprised. But it also showed how the government is able to effectively triangulate its diplomatic strategy and be a regional hub.

Nonetheless, we are still left with the fundamental issues of the past decade.

We still have a very strong government and a lack of effective opposition in Serbia, with perennial concerns about media freedom. Bosnia remains politically stuck. North Macedonia was a success story after it solved its issue with Greece, but is now running into a new problem with Bulgaria about differing interpretations of their respective history and the extent of their shared national identity - a dispute that is holding up the start of EU accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania. (The EU does not want to split the start of the accession process of the two countries.) In Kosovo, Albin Kurti’s new government is shaking things up, but not doing it in a way that is endearing to the European Union. Moreover, there seems little likelihood of any breakthrough in talks between Belgrade and Pristina.

Meanwhile, the European Union has seemingly turned its attention away from the Western Balkans. From the outside, it appears that there is nothing to be done. From the region, there is a sense that there isn’t an appetite in the EU to really engage. This in turn undermines the whole enlargement process by reducing incentives for regional change. Why do the hard work if the EU shows little obvious sign that it wants them?

That said, the picture isn’t entirely bleak. There are still some grounds for optimism. For instance, the discussions over a Balkans’ Common Regional Market offers a valuable sign of hope. Nevertheless, one can’t help but feel disillusioned about the direction the Western Balkans is taking at the moment and the failure of European leadership. Until the EU gets a far firmer grasp on things, any new US involvement is likely to achieve little.

Copyright: SAUL LOEB / POOL / AFP