All Eyes on Africa: What COP27 Entails for the Continent

Africans are also saying that there have not been enough processes put in place that would enable African countries to receive substantial amounts of this promised money. Some, therefore, argue that an African COP will be a good place to set aside money for African countries for them to better assess funds. 

Energy transition

The second area touched upon when discussing finance concerns energy transition. One of the key events that happened during the COP26 in Glasgow in 2021 was that South Africa received about $8.5 billion from development partners to help it scale up transformational action to wean off its dependence on coal. Since then, some people have been calling for greater transparency in defining climate finance: how do you define it, and what counts as such? Indeed, some people are asking whether the deal that South Africa struck is part of the Hundred Billion Pledge, but rather a side deal reached mostly through bilateral negotiations with a select group of developed countries (US, UK, France). This deal was presented as a breakthrough considered by some as one option to help other African countries mobilize money to achieve their energy transition.

All of the elements that South Africa has that make the "right" place to start this model may not apply to others, which can present a challenge. We, therefore, need to be careful that these bilateral deals do not replace multilateralism, which tends to create greater opportunities for countries regardless of their negotiating powers and abilities. 

Loss and Damage debate

The third area that somewhat relates to the subject of finance is that of the establishment of loss and damage facility. Interestingly, African countries have not been very prompt and vocal in joining other countries to push for these. I think that part of the hesitation is about what impact, if any, such a facility might have on other pots of money, especially adaptation but also lack of clarity about how such a facility would work in practice. I think that COP27Some African countries are hence likely to be asking more questions before jumping in to support loss and damage facilities. 

Adaptation

Finally, African countries are also claiming that adaptation needs to be higher up on the agenda. One way this has been expressed is by stating that the funding going to climate change needs to be equally split between mitigation and adaptation. Indeed, a huge amount of the money left to African countries goes to climate mitigation, while they are continuously emphasizing that adaptation is one of their key priorities.

Countries tend to work in coalitions during COP negotiations to have their voices heard. What common interests do African countries share? On the contrary, what are the specific interests of some African nations that are not shared with the rest of the continent - can we see some divergence in climate strategies within the continent?  

Two things tend to unite Africa. First, climate justice. There is a  wide perception that Africa is the most vulnerable continent to climate change. In the past it tried to position itself as the conscience of the international climate change regime, being on the one hand the continent that contributes the least to global emissions, but on the other, the one that suffers the most. One thing that is going to unite most African countries is therefore this push for climate justice. The African Union released a call not long ago during the African Climate Week in Gabon for all African agencies to unite in this cry for climate justice and to highlight its impact. In concrete terms, climate justice means emphasizing that industrialized countries have to close the ambition gap because it is the lack of ambition that will irremediably render Africa all the more vulnerable to climate impacts. Along with being united in calling for greater ambition from developed countries, especially the G20, African countries will also be in sync in asking for a greater focus on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), established under the Paris Agreement of 2015. The GGA was broadly championed by Africa, and it helped to bring adaptation, at least rhetorically, at par with mitigation.

However, there are some areas of divergence – coal is one of those. At the Kigali Convention (2022 SEforALL Forum), some were pushing for a communiqué that called for gas to be explicitly admitted as a transition fuel and for more money to be poured into African gas exploration, while others disagreed. In the end, only 11 countries signed the communiqué. The role that gas has to play in future African development is likely to be a divisive issue. This may not be a big issue for landlocked countries that do not have access to the gas resource. It is however a big issue for other countries such as Senegal and Nigeria, and potentially Ghana.

In your view, what impact can the European energy crisis play on African countries' ambitions in anticipation of the COP? Would this impact future commitments (especially mitigation targets) from African countries?

The European energy crisis instigated by the war in Ukraine will have a daunting effect on the ambition of the COP, especially on the quality and quantity of good finance, but also on the commitment to ambitious mitigation targets. The event is taking place in the context of multiple crises at different levels: Covid-19, the war in Ukraine, and food and energy insecurity, all unfolding simultaneously against the backdrop of widening climate impacts. As a result, African countries are now calling for energy security as the main priority for this COP. Without this crisis in Ukraine, that call would have been more urgent, as Europe would have doubled down on its efforts to stop the exploration of fossil fuels. However, the energy crisis caused by the war, and the rising gas prices, have both entrapped the continent into talks that go against this goal (reopening coal factories in Germany, relaxing the fracking ban in the UK, and asking Africa to supply them with gas.

African leaders must seize this opportunity to ensure that deals that are struck prioritize local demand, but also think across the value chain to guarantee investments are done in a way that generates value and triggers opportunities for climate innovation in Africa. In the longer term, we must focus on investing in renewables and not using the war in Ukraine as a pretext for making all sorts of investments not consistent with climate ambition. 

The discussion about the need to attend to climate change has really standardized and taken hold, and continues to be the dominant narrative before COP27. However, we could witness hypocritical attitudes from some countries during the event, which will attend the talk whilst still quietly pursuing fossil fuel investment. However, this does not imply that the general commitment to fighting climate change is not strong. In the run-up to COP26, I wrote a piece stating that the emphasis on zero carbon should also go alongside an emphasis on zero hunger and zero poverty. I wrote another paper advocating that the energy crisis in Europe exposed the hypocrisy of the continent. I hope that the wider West will now be more humble in understanding the sort of conflict that Africa faced all these years:  needing to act on climate change but also having to tackle the urgent and immediate needs of poverty alleviation and hunger. The crisis in Europe confronts the continent with the challenges Africa has faced, which have usually been swept under the rug. The take-home message is that, rather than try to boss Africa around as was the case in the colonial era, there is a need for a clear, mature, respectful conversation about the pathway Africa can follow to achieve sustainable development while also making substantial contributions to climate action. 

I strongly believe this COP can deliver on Loss and Damage. Through coalition building, Africa, especially given what is happening in Pakistan (catastrophic floods caused widespread devastation, major financial losses, and killed over 1,400 people), might get loss and damage facilities on the agenda this year, which could be seen as something to celebrate. However, one thing to bear in mind is that it is possible for the West to cave into diplomacy and moral cajoling by poor countries and agree to set up a loss and damage facility, and then take forever to define what it would do and how it will operate. In sum, while I would like to remain optimistic I worry that the wider geopolitical context may result in a COP with very limited gains for Africa. 

Copyright: AMOS GUMULIRA / AFP