After the Trump-Xi Meeting in Beijing: a Fragile "Strategic Stability"

In today’s world, where so much interpretation depends on media communication, the Trump-Xi meeting of May 14-15 is a prime example of how some events can be misunderstood. The principals themselves have communicated sparingly - least of all, China, which is par for the course, but also Donald Trump. He has been more restrained than usual, even including a Fox interview and the few juicy quotes he made aboard Air Force One on the flight back to Washington.

Overall, the biggest surprise is the absence of surprises. Xi gave all the proper signs of decorum to the U.S. president, including a visit to his inner-sanctum residence at Zhongnanhai. Donald Trump, for his part, did not depart from his official speech at the state banquet, and exhibited gushing praise for Xi. There were no speeches or huddles with any crowd, large or small. The only minor recorded incident was an isolated security scuffle. Human rights were absent from the agenda, save a mention ofJimmy Lai ("a tough one" for Xi, Trump added), and of a pastor who had been released.

The Western press had emphasized Trump give ins, but China’s main strategic partners exhibit worry 

Of course, other heads of states and governments, including from allied countries and close partners, may feel they are treated far more harshly by the U.S. president than autocratic rulers are. Yet China’s quasi-allies, from Russia to Iran and North Korea, must be looking over their shoulder for signs of a letdown by China, their number one houtai (a backstage supporter, as the Chinese customary saying goes).

Russia, whose ruler is likely coming for reassurance to Beijing on May 19-20, has also let out some public anxiety about China’s behavior. On May 16, RT, the official Russian network and media, published a criticism of China: "China still often behaves as though it can enjoy the benefits of strategic partnership without fully committing itself to the burdens that come with it". It’s indeed very rare for Russia to acknowledge such sentiments publicly, which apply so well to China’s lesser partners such as Venezuela, Cuba or Iran.

These signs should caution us against the current wave of comments according to which the U.S. has given away the store, without extracting concessions from China. China has its own calculus, certainly very different from the current U.S. negotiating style. It looks very carefully at trade-offs and does its best to assess the exact weight and punch of every partner. It is in fact better at gauging similarly authoritarian regimes than fickle democracies, including the United States. Iran and Russia seem to have their own suspicions.

Narratives Neither Convergent Nor Contradictory, Merely Complementary

The converse is also true, especially under Donald Trump. The U.S., perhaps more than China, values deals over alliances (or "strategic partnerships", as Beijing prefers to call them). This administration sometimes appears more inclined to accommodate solid adversaries than liberal democracies which it equates with its own domestic opposition. Several former high level security advisers, Republicans as well as Democrats, point out that Washington, after making huge initial demands, now concedes too much and too quickly to Beijing. This is the mental lanscape that we have arrived at, and it forms a good basis to try and understand the outcome and potential fallout of the Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing. 

First, there is less of a convergent narrative than a complementary one, which could either be fleshed out or drift into contradictions over time. The word "trust" has disappeared from China’s vocabulary, replaced instead by an agreement on "strategic stability", albeit with different emphasis on each side: "fairness and reciprocity" for the U.S., a "constructive relationship (…) a positive stability with cooperation as the main theme (…) in the next three years and beyond" for China. Each side claims its own formulation is endorsed by the other side.

These variations are a revealing picture of the entire event, since the official read-outs differ so markedly from one another. Donald Trump has amplified his claims of Chinese concessions while official Chinese statements, from Xi downward, are much more restrained. Yet on some specifics, China becomes suddenly very articulate: "beef facility registration", importing "poultry meat from certain U.S. states", recognition of Shandong as an avian influenza free zone, ending "automatic detention of dairy and aquatic products" by U.S. customs, and even accepting Chinese "potted landscapes"! Beyond this (and a Boeing deal, see below), America’s tech giants accompanying the trip mostly got a pep talk from Prime Minister Li Qiang.

What this charade means is that, for China, a deal is only a deal once it has been signed and sealed - and only then do concrete business outcomes really exist. For the current U.S. administration and for the President, a deal is to be trumpeted way before it is endorsed. With China, as with some others recently, the score often looks more like a wish list than a binding agreement. Others - the EU, Japan, South Korea among others - may sign up to huge figures for committing future investment. China, by contrast, which is not short on rhetoric and promises in principle when needed, will not be pinned down on actual numbers.

This dynamic applies to the trip’s most important business outcome - the signing on aircraft and engine purchases by China after a decade-long dry interval. Here, the two sides converge on the items. Donald Trump quantifies the deal ("200 big planes", by which he probably meant wide-bodies 777 and 737, and General Electric engines, with additional orders to follow). China gives no figure and treats the engine issue as a U.S. concession: a "U.S. guarantee of aircraft and aircraft parts to China", presumably meaning that the U.S. will not impose on China export denials as it has done with Russia. Many observers have noted that the figure cited by the President fell below expectations. Orders with Airbus "up to 500 planes" had reportedly been ready for signature since Emmanuel Macron’s China trip in November 2025 (and the "General Electric engines" mentioned by Trump for the 777s and 737s are in fact co-produced or co-developed with Safran, the French aerospace company). At the time, it seemed that a major reason for delaying confirmation appeared to be the need for China to give a priority to Donald Trump’s planned state visit. At present, the only consideration preventing China from playing numbers with each partner is the unfortunate reality that both manufacturers are overstretched. 

Both sides made no public allusion to AI or digital issues, including cyber security, except a boast by the president on the U.S.’ offensive cyber capacities, and his open acknowledgment that both sides spy on each other. Nothing was said from the Chinese side on crucial rare earths and critical materials, despite the considerable leverage these resources have provided Beijing over the past year. Neither did Chinese officials talk publicly of export controls, save the "guarantee" it claims to have obtained on jet engines and parts. In contrast, the White House factsheet says that "China will address U.S. concerns regarding supply chain shortages related to rare earths and other critical minerals, including yttrium, scandium, neodymium, and indium. China will also address U.S. concerns regarding prohibitions or restrictions on the sale of rare earth production and processing equipment and technologies".

Trump’s Avoiding Strategic Conflict, but Hardly Ceding Ground

Trade is obviously an important concern for both Trump and Xi. But strategic issues also had their day at the meeting, although in an even more different shape from both sides.

First, the often-seen interpretation that the U.S. president conceded huge changes in Taiwan policy does not fit available facts. Xi Jinping’s preliminary warning was less unprecedented and ominous than it is sometimes said to be. Xi has warned more directly Joe Biden on arms sales, and in fact his statement was a general one, applying to any U.S. president, just as the agreement on "strategic stability" is said to run "for three years and beyond". The President, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and U.S. ambassador to China David Perdue have all denied any change to Taiwan policy. Some of Donald Trump’s utterances are more ambiguous, but perhaps inconsequential if not followed by facts: Taiwan, that "very small country" or just "a place" that "stole our chips", while China is a "a very, very powerful, big country" ; reminding his audience of the tyranny of distance (Taiwan, 9500 miles away from the U.S. while China is just 59 miles from the island…) ; saying that claiming independence is tantamount to calling for a war under the protection of the United States.

Perhaps the biggest ambiguity has not been reported by the transcript that is most often cited, including by Senate Democrats, from Trump’s long Fox interview in Beijing. At minute 4 of the video, Trump clearly says "by the way, we spent most of the night talking about that issue". It is likely an exaggeration but also a spontaneous response that shows how central the Taiwan issue remains, and that the president was duly briefed on it. This makes it less believable that the issue of arms sales was not discussed, and that the U.S. President reserves all options on this, including as a "bargaining chip". But the constant doctrine since Ronald Reagan and the Third US-China Communiqué, as it is still described on the Department of State’s website, is that you don’t make a commitment to China on this issue, and grade weapon sales according to perceived tensions in the Taiwan Strait. So far, this has not been negated, and it is in fact Taiwan’s Kuomintang opposition party that refuses defense budget increases. 

This writer’s humble opinion: Joe Biden had tilted strategic ambiguity by implying repeatedly that he would go to war over the use of force by China. Trump is reversing the trend and putting Taiwan on notice about the independence issue. And he advises both sides to "cool it": in current presidential parlance, isn’t that the requirement for a "peaceful resolution", really the median line of strategic ambiguity? In typical fashion, the president talks of tariffs on Taiwan - which does have the world’s largest ratio of current account surplus to GDP. And officials have repeatedly criticized Taiwan’s insufficient fiscal and human commitments to its own defense. Obviously, a Taiwan government that would by itself arrive at a satisfactory deal with Beijing would save America from the potential burden of a war. In fact, Donald Trump raises the possibility of an armed conflict beyond his own term. This is not pro-Taiwan, but neither is it pro-PRC. Talking about a conflict as a terrible thing is a reminder to American voters that he is not an interventionist. It clearly matters in these days of unpredicted war with Iran. This is part of his usual vocabulary, including in fact over Iran.

A "Strategic Stability" That Remains Fragile and Could Be Short Term

In a pre-summit analysis, we had described both sides’ intention to "put lipstick on the pig". This has indeed happened, with claims by the U.S. side of important concessions, while a shrewd analysis of the first take-aways by Chinese pundits has them seeing a "thaw", and even a structural breakthrough, based on the recognition of China as an equal partner to the United States. American strategists criticizing the trip do cite the common pledge to "strategic stability" as one of these language traps that China likes to create, ensnaring its partners under new obligations and new red lines not to be crossed.

Xi’s China exhibits continuity and tenacity of purpose - which does not exclude blind opportunism when the occasion presents itself or when it wants to escape commitments. Even if the U.S. president has refrained from improvisation and stuck to scripts much more than it is often alleged, that same continuity remains to be demonstrated from U.S. policy.

Observers have noted the public absence of many topics - from AI to export control. On our part, we note the disappearance on the Chinese side of one word that they like to use: the need for trust. And the picture of Americans unloading all their Chinese gifts in a dustbin before climbing on board Air Force One makes for an apt symbol. There is no question that getting results on the Taiwan issue and limiting American options through a "strategic stability" that would include the return of all sorts of exchanges including from "people to people" is the top Chinese priorities. On May 13, the very day that the President’s plane landed in Beijing, the think tank directly affiliated to China’s Ministry of State Security published a lengthy exposé detailing the process and its benefits. It is based on the premise of a "strategic stalemate"( 战略相持) against the backdrop of global chaos. The note leaves almost no topic untouched, and now looks like an expanded preview of the summit seen from the Chinese side. 

If it looks like a G2, feels like a G2 and talks like a G2, then it must be close to a G2.

This is a striking reversal of China’s standard denial and refusal of this concept - if only to avoid anxiety among its other partners, whether they are strategic friends or just the "Global South". The Western press often emphasizes concessions and even defeatism from the U.S. administration. Yet it is clear that China is mounting a new offensive towards improved relations with the United States. That policy emphasis comes both from unspoken weaknesses - a slow-moving domestic economy in spite of huge investments, perhaps a military command put in disarray from purges. There is also a new confidence that China can walk back the decade long strategic consensus in the United States on slowing down the PRC’s rise. China’s red lines are emphasized - and if human rights and democracy now look like a foregone conclusion, the Taiwan issue and the "right to development" (read: the right to export its way out of any domestic economic slump) will be the guideposts on this.