War in Ukraine - France Needs to Reassess its Foreign Policy Options

Once any confusion about where France’s stance has been clarified to her partners, the nation will naturally regain a strong negotiating position. The French could leverage their approval of Ukraine’s entry into the Union to advance its own priorities: a strengthened euro zone, the primacy of the rule of law, a nuclear-friendly energy policy as well as their "resilience agenda" or "strategic sovereignty" plan, to name a few. In other words, France could turn the tide in this seemingly weakening moment for her position in Europe, and make this setback an opportunity for growth. 

Finally, it has become clear that the European states will have to bet big on a defense upgrade. The French might get satisfaction in their project to build a European defense if France can successfully show that the EU can contribute to funding national defense efforts, in conjunction with NATO. This is also the only way that a European defense industry could see the light. 

Western leadership on the global stage

As we have just explained, the war impacted France’s leadership role within Europe. We might also want to point out that Western leadership in general is challenged on the international scene. The developing world, even as it condemns the Russian aggression, is evidently not ready to follow in Western footsteps in isolating and weakening Russia. The worldview which opposes democracies against authoritarianism clashes with the more widely accepted opposition of the West against the rest of the world. The Russian narrative widely spread around the globe, this idea that Vladimir Putin was forced to attack Ukraine in a preemptive defense of his country.

France has always been careful in remaining open to the Global South. It is at the core of its strategy to promote multilateralism. How can it contribute to this project in this context? The aforementioned note published by Institut Montaigne on June 8^th 2022 identifies three perspectives.

Next, we should reorient our approach to global governance. The developing world is anxious to see a changing globalization, especially with the application of war-related sanctions. Their worries are legitimate. Within the G7 and other global forums, France could push to enact Russian sanctions with a clear objective: to push the narrative that the West is promoting global stability, despite Russians and Chinese claims. 

Finally, we should work to rearrange Western alliances. To preserve its role on the world scene, France needs to remain active in Africa, in the Middle East and in the Indo-Pacific. It is in France’s interest that Europe take on a more important geopolitical role. In the current context however, in the wake of the war, Europeans are at a risk of folding inwards, focusing only on problems arising on the continent, reducing their scope. To avoid this type of downgrade, renewed efforts to construct a European defense could allow for fruitful strategic discussions with Washington on the distribution of global responsibilities between Europeans and Americans, in tandem with their allies in the Pacific.

France, Europe and Russia

Back to where we started: underneath the relatively superficial disagreements between France and its allies, could there lie a deeper divergence of opinions on the future of Russian relations? Isn’t that not what makes a "Franco-German" approach so different from the Anglo-Saxon way, which Central and Nordic Europe share too? 

The reason why we should be careful about not humiliating Russia, according to Macron in an interview with French regional press on June 2^nd, is that "when fighting finally stops, we need to be able to build an exit route through diplomacy". 

It is becoming clear that although there is much talk about end goals within the European countries, this type of debate is somewhat futile as long as power dynamics still evolve on the ground. Either way, it is less important to know if it would be preferable to run Russian forces out of Crimea, or let them have the Donbas to spare them the humiliation because only time will tell what outcome is available to us. It is however very important that the great capitals of the Western world seriously consider the "day after" the conflict. The most plausible outcome is that Russia will come out weakened but vengeful, more aggressive and even more dependent on China. Ukraine and Europe would generally remain vulnerable to renewed attacks or at the very least destabilization attempts. This is why we need to be prepared for prolonged tensions, an atmosphere of confrontation and a relationship of antagonism, in Europe and elsewhere. Will there even be room for diplomacy then? 

In a way, the answer to this question is yes. We will have to maintain channels for communication open and show that we can be both reasonable and transparent to avoid miscalculations on either side. But if we are thinking of a grand bargain, the answer is no. There can be no grand negotiations on the new "security architecture of Europe" which had long been the goal of French diplomacy. For credibility reasons, French leaders need to prove to the world that they got the memo: move on. 

Copyright: Ludovic MARIN / AFP