Kazakhstan in Crisis: Politics and Geopolitics

Three questions to Nargis Kassenova

Senior Fellow and director of the Program on Central Asia at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (Harvard University)

On January 5, protests in Kazakhstan’s largest city Almaty brought the country under new scrutiny. After the dust settled, the public was left to wonder how the protests will influence the world and whether they disturbed the regional equilibrium. Nargis Kassenova, a central Asian specialist and Senior Fellow at Harvard University offers her insight on what is at stake for Kazakhstan’s future and for its place within Central Asia.

Are we facing spontaneous social unrest, a "coup attempt" organized by a "single center" as mentioned by president Tokayev in his Monday, January 10, 2022 speech ? What is your understanding of Kazakhstan's internal political situation?

The protests themselves were not surprising, since the socio-economic grievances had been accumulating over time. The situation worsened as a result of the economic recession caused by the pandemic (inflation rates were above 8% for all the end of 2021). What was surprising was the speed with which they spread across the country. The protests started in Zhanaozen, a little town in western Kazakhstan in the oil rich Mangistau region, and were triggered by the spike in the prices on liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) (a term most Kazakhstan people didn’t even know before the protests). Due to reforms in the fuel market, the prices of LPG doubled from 50 tenge per liter ($0.11) in 2021 to 120 tenge per liter ($0.28) on January 1. It was not the first protest in Zhanaozen, the tensions were rising, and as it turned out the rest of the country was also on the edge.

Kazakhstan was in a duumvirate situation where two presidents co-ruled for some time: Tokayev, the President of the country, but also Nazarbayev, with his title of the First President-Leader of the Nation. Nazarbayev did not relinquish power, and retained his position as head of the ruling Nur-Otan party until the end of 2021 and as head of the Security Council until last Wednesday.

Ever since 2010, with the amendments to the Constitutional Law, there has been a preparation of legislation for a political transition.

Ever since 2010, with the amendments to the Constitutional Law, there has been a preparation of legislation for a political transition. Nazarbayev received the title of Leader of the Nation and a set of life-long rights and immunity from prosecution. His family members were also granted immunity. Despite his resignation, Nazarbayev kept representing Kazakhstan at different international forums. The latest took place at the end of December, when he attended, together with President Tokayev, an informal summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Saint Petersburg.

So, the transition had been prepared for a long time, and the 2019 transition did not seem complete. Before last week, President Tokayev did not have the full power he was entitled to have as a country’s Head of State. It remains to be seen whether additional constitutional changes will be needed to complete and stabilize the transition.

I am skeptical about the government’s claim that there was one "single center" organizing the protests and believe that they were spontaneous. Very quickly political demands like the removal of Nazarbayev, and the organization of free and fair elections arose. I take President Tokayev’s claim that this was an attempted coup more seriously, because we do see a very serious shake-up at the top of the political system. Importantly, Tokayev’s speech had direct references to Nazarbayev and his family business.

At present it is not clear what the future will be, it is not even clear where Nazarbayev is. According to the press secretary, he is in Nur-Sultan, and he is in consultation with president Tokayev. The health condition of the 81 years old "former" President is also unknown, as the events were probably quite a shock for him. We also still don't know if charges will be pressed against him or not. I would suspect his family members may be affected. He may be left in peace, so as not to upset an already difficult situation.

What are the possible consequences of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) intervention on Kazakhstan’s political trajectory and its relationship with Russia?

The CSTO support came as a big surprise and the full picture of how it happened is still relatively unclear. The intervention put Kazakhstan in the uncomfortable position of Russia’s protectorate. It does not look good being an independent stable mid-level power for thirty years, but still having to ask Russia for help. I think, though, that the situation with Kazakhstan's weakened position is not irreparable.

The discussion is now rather: how necessary was it? The situation did start to improve prior to the arrival of the Russian troops. On January 6, 2500 Russian peacekeepers were sent to help. I would think that it was largely symbolic, as Kazakhstan has enough forces by itself and 2500 is a rather small contingent. Kazakhstan has been investing in the security apparatus for years, and local forces were certainly enough to deal with the militants. Now there are armed vehicles in the streets of Almaty and things have really calmed down in the last few days and this was largely done thanks to Kazakh own military forces.

We can assume a political struggle at the top of the political system, and clearly Putin gave support to President Tokayev during the crisis. CSTO didn’t grant this kind of assistance to Kyrgyzstan when the Kyrghyz interim government asked in 2010. Armenia recently also asked for Russian help to no avail. The sending of CSTO troops to a member state to deal with a political crisis is something new. Officially, it’s to help with the conduct of a counter-terrorist operation, but it makes little sense to be sending "peacekeepers" to deal with a terrorist attack.

We can assume a political struggle at the top of the political system, and clearly Putin gave support to President Tokayev during the crisis.

The officials are already reframing the narrative and talking about internal actors who with the support of external forces destabilized Kazakhstan. It seems to me the claim that it was an external terrorist attack was a way to to justify a quick CSTO intervention.

For what we know, the CSTO troops are not participating in military operations. They are just guarding key infrastructure. It seems the goal was mostly symbolic, to provide support to President Tokayev and to signal to the political elites in Kazakhstan that he has Putin’s endorsement. What happened in Kazakhstan is not a color revolution though. President Putin does not like Kaddafi-type scenarios, he does not like the tragic end of dictators. It scares him and we see what has been happening to removed authoritarian leaders in the post-Soviet space. Russia invited and accepted Askar Akayev: the first President of Kyrgyzstan. The second President of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has been in exile in Minsk since the Kyrghyz revolution of 2010. Viktor Yanukovych (President of Ukraine until 2014) had also fled to Russia after the Euromaidan civil unrest. Russia accepts a downfall, but Putin does not want popular vengeance to unravel. Russia thus needs to manage the transition in Kazakhstan. They have accepted the fact that there is a transition in Kazakhstan and that the Nazarbayev family needs to be pushed aside if necessary.

What does the crisis tell us about the dynamic of Russia-China relations in Central Asia?

What we know is quite scarce. We know that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also offered help, but I think it was more of a symbolic gesture as a regional security organization.

I do not think that the situation will really affect China-Russia relations, but Kazakhstan will lean more towards Russia now, because the government owes Russia for its help. Kazakhstan has always been in Russia’s sphere of influence, and the two countries have a lot of interdependencies. They have strong links and common business and security, and social interests, and deep people-to-people connections.

At the same time, Kazakhstan is also striving to build up its sovereignty, while avoiding antagonizing Russia. Kazakhstan maintains friendly relationships with the rest of the world and develops its relations with China, the West, Turkey (Kazakhstan is a member of the Organization of Turkic States), and Muslim countries. I would expect Kazakhstan to continue its multi-vectoral foreign policy balancing relations with great powers. Some do say that this crisis will put an end to this policy, but I think Kazakhstan will maintain its balancing act.

Geopolitical rivalries between Russia and the West are making things more difficult for countries in between, like Kazakhstan, which tries not to be too overwhelmed by Russia. For example, Kazakhstan did not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, and did not support Russia on the Crimea annexation issue. It abstained in a number of United Nations votes. The intensification of these rivalries is shrinking the space for maneuver.

Copyright: Abduaziz MADYAROV / AFP